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The Non-Identity Problem 
The non-identity problem originates with the work of Derek Parfit and it concerns the 
creation of future people. The non-identity problem comes in two forms - either 
Direct or Indirect.1 Imagine a girl becomes pregnant at the age of fourteen (1984, p. 
358). If she has a child now then it will suffer from her inexperience and financial 
instability - alternatively she can wait until she is older and have a child who will not 
suffer from her young age. Parfit thinks that most would claim that in this situation 
she should wait and have the later child. But by choosing to have a child either now or 
later, the girl does not make anyone’s life better than it could otherwise have been. 
The first child would not exist at all if the mother waits - waiting does not lead to the 
existence of the same child in better circumstances: a completely different child 
exists. The mother faces a choice between separate distinct children. This is the Direct 
version of the non-identity problem. 
The Indirect version of the non-identity problem occurs when selecting a 
policy which affects where and when people are born, thus altering the makeup of the 
resulting population. Parfit’s famous example is the social policy choice between 
Conservation and Depletion. A community chooses either depletion or conservation 
of resources; if depletion is chosen the living standard ‘over the next two centuries 
would be slightly higher than it would have been if we had chosen Conservation’ 
(ibid, p. 362). However, the living standard for many generations beyond that would 
‘be much lower than it would have been if we had chosen Conservation’ (ibid). The 
policy chosen affects the lives of those who exist at the time it is implemented and, 
plausibly, it will affect those who will come into existence because people will live 
different lives which would not be available under the alternative policy. The 
                                                 
1 This terminology is David Boonin’s. 
implication of these two scenarios is that if our actions result in different people 
existing, because the behaviour of existing people changes resulting in the creation of 
different offspring, then our actions do not make them better or worse off. Those 
generations who might exist with a low living standard as a result of the depletion 
policy could not otherwise exist and so cannot complain that their lives could have 
been better. 
What underpins the non-identity problem? Consider Wilma: she can conceive a 
child now who will be blind (Pebbles) or take a pill once a day for two months and 
conceive another child who will not be blind (Rocks). Boonin sets out the following 
five propositions: 
 
P1: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for 
two months before conceiving does not make Pebbles worse off than she 
would otherwise have been 
P2: If A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than B would 
otherwise have been 
P3: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for 
two months before conceiving does not harm anyone other than Pebbles 
P4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone 
P5: If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong 
C: Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not morally wrong.  (p. 27) 
 
 
Validity of the Non-identity Problem 
Unsurprisingly, a number of arguments have been brought to bear against the non-
identity problem because it undermines an area of major moral concern - the status of 
future persons. If creating people does not make their lives better or worse then we 
cannot claim that by having disabled children we are making their lives worse than 
they otherwise would have been, nor can we claim that we are benefiting those who 
come to exist. 
David Boonin’s book addresses a number of objections to the non-identity 
problem and finds them inadequate - he concludes that we must accept the non-
identity problem as the correct explanation of future people. Boonin covers the 
arguments targeting each of the premises and provides counter-arguments against 
them. Boonin’s book is, therefore, an excellent introduction and reference guide for 
anyone interested in the non-identity problem. 
By considering each proposition in turn Boonin is able to consider a wide 
variety of otherwise disparate issues in a straightforward and clear manner. The most 
useful feature of Boonin’s work is the book’s structure: each chapter covers one of the 
premises above, setting out the arguments objecting to the premise followed by 
Boonin’s challenge to those objections. These objections are always taken in their 
strongest form, with Boonin arguing that even if we accept the objections they still 
fail to undermine the relevant proposition. Even more helpfully, arguments against the 
objections based on their internal coherence are included as a set of appendices 
allowing the reader to engage with a wide variety of issues relating to the non-identity 
problem. For example, chapter three covers the second harm related proposition and 
considers the objections to it along with different conceptions of harm. The relevant 
appendix (A) considers arguments concerning the internal coherence of accounts of 
harm while the substantive chapter itself takes as read the objections to the 
comparative account of harm and then argues that this account would still fail to 
undermine the second proposition because the alternatives are either absurd or entail 
that harm does not occur (p.102). In this way Boonin successfully collates a range of 
issues concerning the non-identity problem in an accessible and informative book 
which, if nothing else, serves as a springboard for those considering non-identity 
problems. 
For example, one objection Boonin analyses is the de re de dicto distinction. 
Boonin’s analysis concerns two interpretations of the reproductive scenarios: the de re 
understanding focuses on the child Wilma actually has and the de dicto understanding 
that ‘whatever person turns out to satisfy the description “her child”’ (p. 31) may be 
worse off than some other person who could have satisfied that description. On the de 
dicto interpretation Wilma’s act does make ‘her child’ worse off because both 
possible children can be ‘her child’. However, this is insufficient to counter the non-
identity argument because an additional component is needed, namely that harm in 
the de dicto sense is relevant to determining whether an act is morally wrong. 
Boonin points out that the de dicto interpretation can itself be interpreted in 
two different ways: we can focus on either the ‘magnitude of the harm’ or the 
individual’s total ‘level of health’ (p. 35) that would be suffered by whoever satisfies 
the descriptive statement. Consider a Minor and a Severe accident in which the driver 
in Minor suffers a broken arm while the driver in Severe suffers a traumatic brain 
injury - this is a case concerning the magnitude of an injury. Now consider two cases 
in which a driver suffers a broken arm. In the first vehicle the driver is Ambidextrous 
while the second the driver is Handicapped and has the use of only one arm. Here, an 
injury of the same magnitude - a broken arm - has very different implications for each 
driver. For Ambidextrous a broken arm is a minor inconvenience because he simply 
uses his other arm. However, for Handicapped a broken arm means that he is wholly 
dependent on care and assistance until his one usable arm has healed sufficiently for 
him to use it again. The total level of health of each driver differs, resulting in an 
injury of the same magnitude having different effects. 
In the case of accident policies we can either choose a policy which reduces 
the severity of accidents or we can try to ensure that healthier people have the more 
severe accidents. Boonin argues that the first sense must be used: in improving road 
safety the ‘job is to reduce the severity of the accidents that occur, not to increase the 
severity of the accidents by redirecting them onto healthier people’ (p. 36). Similarly, 
in the case of reproduction, a prospective parent’s ‘duty is simply to minimise the 
harm that will be incurred by whatever person turns out to occupy the role of her 
child’ (p. 36). Additionally, this brings in the notion of harm into reproduction which 
Boonin covers in chapters 3 and 4. 
Here, I merely highlight the range of Boonin’s book; although it primarily 
deals with reproduction, the topics that are discussed provide an excellent introduction 
and a useful analysis to many other topics. We can see from the de re de dicto 
discussion that it extends beyond reproduction and can encourage the reader to 
consider different and broader areas. Boonin demonstrates this wide applicability with 
his comprehensive study of the range of issues confronting the non-identity problem. 
Chapter two covers the problems of creating people, classification of our 
actions towards them and the effects of our actions; here we find the de re de dicto 
objection, the metaphysics of generating persons, the problem of a life worth living 
and the apparent asymmetry between pleasure and pain. Chapters three and four cover 
notions of harm both in conceptions of harm (for example comparative and non-
comparative accounts of harms) and who can be harmed (that is, whether those we 
create can be harmed by our actions). Chapter five covers rights-, fairness- and 
respect-based arguments concerning how we treat people, and specifically considers 
whether we are constrained and obligated to treat potential or future persons in a 
certain manner. Chapter six covers notions of aggregate effect on person-groups and 
optimal outcomes, thus dealing with Utilitarian and other standards of wellbeing-
based accounts of benefit and harm.  
After arguing that these issues fail to show the non-identity problem is 
incorrect or inconsistent, Boonin proposes that the only option is to accept the non-
identity conclusion. Thus in cases that produce the non-identity problem it is not 
morally wrong to have any particular child even if they are disabled or otherwise 
suffering. As a consequence of discussing this broad range of issues, Boonin makes it 
easy for someone new to the non-identity problem to engage with the topic and for 
those familiar with the problem to think of the issues in a more schematic way. 
The final chapter is primarily concerned with showing that accepting the non-
identity conclusion meets Boonin’s own requirement for a satisfactory solution, 
namely, the independence, robustness and modesty requirements. The independence 
requirement prevents us from denying the validity of a premise purely on the basis 
that it allows us to reject the non-identity conclusion. For example, Allen Buchanan et 
al claim that ‘an adequate moral theory should include as well non-person-affecting 
principles’ (2006, p. 250). The reason given for this, as far as can be inferred from 
their book, is that we should ‘abandon the specific feature of typical moral principles 
about obligations to prevent or not cause harm which generates difficulty … in 
genesis cases’ (p. 248). Here, Buchanan et al fail to provide a reason which is 
independent from being able to deny the non-identity outcome, unlike Parfit himself 
who argues for a utilitarian theory of conduct for reasons independent of the non-
identity problem (1984, p. 446). 
The robustness requirement means that our reason for rejecting a premise 
‘must be strong enough to warrant rejecting any weakened version of the premise’ (p. 
22). The third and final requirement is the modesty requirement which entails that the 
reason for rejecting a premise does not lead to a more absurd outcome than the non-
identity conclusion itself. Consider, if the property of Wilma’s act that is determined 
to be wrong is found in all human action then every human action is morally wrong 
and so prohibited, but this outcome is more absurd than the non-identity conclusion 
itself. This final requirement relies on a fair amount of subjective judgement but it 
seems to be clear enough that the reason for rejecting the non-identity problem should 
not lead to an outcome which classifies all reproductive action or all human action as 
morally prohibited. 
 Implications of the Non-identity Problem 
The final chapter helps secure Boonin’s conclusion by showing how accepting the 
non-identity outcome satisfies these three requirements, but he only hints at some of 
the broader implications for the actions individuals may take.  If there is any criticism 
of Boonin’s book, it is that he spends very little time on the implications of accepting 
the non-identity conclusion (a mere two and a half pages). If arguments against the 
non-identity conclusion fail then we should accept that non-identity is the best 
explanation for the effects of our actions that create people. He says, for example, that 
his ‘solution tends in the direction of more’ (p. 216) reproductive freedom. Beyond 
this and a few other equally brief statements, Boonin does not explore the 
implications of accepting the non-identity conclusion further. This seems odd given 
the radical implications of accepting the non-identity conclusion. 
The non-identity conclusion has wide ranging and startling implications for a 
number of legal issues - most obviously for law relating to reproduction and for 
population policy choices. Accepting the non-identity conclusion makes civil liability 
for pre-natal harm more uncertain because no person exists at the time the harm 
occurs, thus a new person may be created by that action (see Walker, 2014a); errors in 
genetic testing prior to conception would also be affected by the non-identity 
problem; assessing the welfare of a child created through artificial reproduction would 
become incoherent; and there are implications for selection and genetic modification 
of offspring (see Walker, 2014b). The non-identity conclusion prevents us from 
claiming that future people can be made better or worse off, that any future people are 
entitled to exist, and that we should conserve resources now for future people because 
only once a person exists can effects happen to them rather than constituting them.  
The Thalidomide case brings out some of the difficulties in accepting this 
conclusion. Ordinarily, we would say that a foetus affected by thalidomide would 
harm the person born because without the introduction of thalidomide the foetus 
would have developed according to its genomic structure. But this depends on one’s 
conception of a person – our ordinary discourse implies that a person is reducible to 
their genomic structure. The non-identity conclusion arises because our actions do not 
affect a person but change which person exists. Where the timing of pregnancy 
changes so too does the person created. This proposition is less clear when an action 
occurs during pregnancy - does changing an embryo or a foetus lead to a different 
person existing? 
This is difficult terrain because, unlike the cases where a woman has a child at 
a different time, there is a lack of metaphysical precision when it comes to a person 
existing. If one takes the existence of a unique genome to be a person then everything 
past fertilisation is a person; if one takes sentience to mark a new person then this may 
cover a broad period of gestation; or if one takes self-awareness as a distinct entity as 
indicating a new person then only an infant of at least 15-18 months would count. 
Thus, there is ambiguity where damage occurs during pregnancy as it depends on 
when one considers a person to have come into existence. This would limit the 
application of the non-identity conclusion depending on how early one places the 
existence of a new person. The ambiguity problem does not arise when the decision 
affects the timing of pregnancy - it only arises once pregnancy begins and, therefore, 
does not apply in indirect population policy cases.  
In generational population policies those born in worse circumstances, due to 
the adoption of policy A, cannot complain of this fact because the alternative policy B 
would have led to different circumstances and to the existence of different people. 
These implications have profound consequences for how we think of reproduction 
and generational responsibility and liability, yet these discussions are absent from 
Boonin’s account. Perhaps Boonin is reluctant to venture too far into these areas as he 
is concerned with showing the validity of the non-identity conclusion. Even so, a 
greater exploration of the implications would have provided a useful and suitable end 
to his book. 
Boonin even seems to underestimate the impact of the non-identity 
conclusion. He suggests that there is ‘no reason to think that ordinary cases of 
pollution and of risking pollution are sufficient to generate the non-identity problem’ 
(p. 216). Yet this seems to underestimate the impact of (to use Boonin’s example) the 
opening of a nuclear power plant which would cause people to move and work in 
different places than they otherwise would have. Consequently, there is no way for us 
to know who would have existed in both scenarios and who would exist in only one. 
This means that we have no epistemological justification for treating the existence of 
some people as more certain than others.  
There is no way to know who will exist as a result of some actions rather than 
other possible actions, and the sheer number of variables that we would need to 
comprehend means we cannot know who will exist until they actually do exist. We 
cannot, therefore, treat any one future person’s existence as unaffected by our actions 
because even though we can comprehend the idea that someone’s existence will be 
unaffected we have no way of determining who those individuals are. Moreover, 
every future person’s existence is contingent on someone’s choice and, in this sense, 
no one future person’s existence is certain. Thus ‘if there do turn out to be particular 
cases in which we act in ways that are worse for no one’ (p. 216), or if there is no way 
to know who those worse off people are, then the non-identity conclusion would 
‘make it harder to argue against those practices’ (p. 216). 
Consequently, Boonin should have explored the implications of accepting the 
non-identity conclusion further because of the widespread impact such a conclusion 
would have on ethics, population theories, law, education, culture and religion. 
However, this should not detract from the great detail and clarity with which Boonin 
treats the premises of the non-identity problem and the thoroughness with which he 
works through the issues relating to non-identity. This is an excellent book for anyone 
wanting to explore the non-identity problem. 
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